# INTRODUCTION

Author ? : Assocaite Prof., Department Of MCA, Basaveswara Institute Of Information Technology, Hyderabad, AndhraPradesh, INDIA-500027.

Author ? : Professor & Head, Department of OR & SQC , Rayalaseema University, Kurnool, Andhra Pradesh, India -518002.

Each style of ad hoc network routing protocol has advantages and disadvantages. In this paper, we focus on securing ad hoc network routing using periodic (or proactive) protocols, and in particular, using distance vector routing protocols. Distance vector routing protocols are easy to implement, require relatively little memory or CPU processing capacity compared to other types of routing protocols, and are widely used in networks of moderate size within the (wired) Internet [32,33,34]. A number of proposed periodic ad hoc network routing protocols are based on adapting the basic distance vector routing protocol design for use in mobile wireless ad hoc networks, including PRNET [26], DSDV [28], WRP [27], WIRP [25], and ADV [23]. Distance vector routing has also been used for routing within a zone in the ZRP hybrid ad hoc network routing protocol [31].

Ad-hoc network is a computer network in which the communication links are wireless and the devices on it communicate directly with each other. This allows all wireless devices within range of each other to discover and communicate in a peer-to-peer fashion without involving central access points.

An ad-hoc network tends to feature a small group of devices all in very close proximity to each other. Performance degrades as the number of devices grows, and a large ad-hoc network quickly becomes difficult to manage.

To design an Ad hoc network routing protocol is challenging, and to design a secure one is even more difficult. There are many research focus on how to provide efficient [35,36] and secure [37,38] communication in ad hoc networks.

The Secure Efficient Ad hoc Distance Vector (SEAD) [40] protocol uses one-way hash chains to prevent an attacker from forging better metrics or sequence numbers. But SEAD does not prevent an attacker from tampering other fields or from using the learned metric and sequence number to send new routing updates. In this paper, we proposed a new ecure Ad Hoc network routing protocols are complex to design, due to the generally highly dynamic nature of an ad hoc network and due to the need to operate efficiently with limited resources, including network bandwidth and the CPU processing capacity, memory, and battery power (energy) of each individual node in the network. Existing insecure ad hoc network routing protocols are often highly optimized to spread new routing information quickly as conditions change, requiring more rapid and often more frequent routing protocol interaction between nodes than is typical in a traditional (e.g., wired and stationary) network. Expensive and cumbersome security mechanisms can delay or prevent such exchanges of routing information, leading to reduced routing S effectiveness, and may consume excessive network or node resources, leading to many new opportunities for possible Denial-of-Service attacks through the routing protocol.

Routing protocols for ad hoc networks generally can be divided into two main categories: Periodic protocols and On-demand protocols. In a periodic (or proactive) routing protocol, nodes periodically exchange routing information with other nodes in an attempt to have each node always know a current route to all destinations (e.g., [22,23,24,25,26,27,28]). In an ondemand (or reactive) protocol, on the other hand, nodes exchange routing information only when needed, with a node attempting to discover a route to some destination only when it has a packet to send to that destination (e.g., [1,29,30]). In addition, some ad hoc network routing protocols are hybrids of periodic and ondemand mechanisms (e.g., [31]).


# 2011

December SEAD-FHC: Secure Efficient Distance Vector Routing with Fixed Hash Chain length protocol to improve security of SEAD. We also conduct some simulation experiments to evaluate the performance of our proposed protocol.


# II.


# PROBLEM DEFINITION

The problem with many routing protocols for ad hoc networks is that those protocols are vulnerable to security attacks. The attacks can be classified as passive or active attacks. In a passive attack, a malicious node ignores operational requirements of the network. For example, an intermediate node along a route does not forward a packet, or hides routing information. Multiple routes and redundant messaging can alleviate passive attacks.

In an active attack, the malicious node introduces false information, e.g., a false distance vector, a false destination sequence, or a false route request. This confuses routing procedures and degrades network performance. With a false route, the malicious node can intercept and comprise packets.

Misdirecting is another active attack. Here, an intermediate node forwards packets along incorrect paths. This attack affects the source node by directing packets away from the intended destination node.

The AODV protocol uses destination sequence numbers to indicate how recently the routing information was generated. When multiple routes are available, the source node always selects a route associated with a largest destination sequence number.

A malicious node can fabricate a false large destination sequence number to attract traffic. Even worse, a deceived node can propagate, in good faith, a false route to other nodes to exacerbate the impact of the attack. In this case, the attacker can maliciously attract and discard data traffic.

A malicious node can also consume a large amount of the network bandwidth by broadcasting fictitious destination addresses to which no node can reply. This delays other traffic and can cause packets to be dropped, lowering overall network performance.


# III.


# RELATED WORK

There are known techniques for minimizing 'Byzantine' failures caused by nodes that through malice or malfunction exhibit arbitrary behavior such as corrupting, forging, and delaying routing messages. A routing protocol is said to be Byzantine robust when it delivers any packet from a source node to a destination as long as there is at least one valid route [3]. However, the complexity of that protocol makes it unsuitable for ad hoc networks.

Papadimitrators et al [4] described a secure routing protocol (SRP) that prevents impersonation and replay attacks for on-demand routing. The protocol disables route caching and provides end-to-end authentication with an HMAC primitive [5]. However, that protocol cannot prevent vicious request flooding because there is no mechanism for authenticating source and intermediate nodes.

Dahill et al [6] introduced another technique uses hop-by-hop authentication. Every node is required to sign and authenticate every message. That increases processing requirements and the size of messages.

Zapata [7] introduced another technique requires that each node has access to a certified public key of all network nodes to validate all routing packets. The originator of a message appends an RSA signature, and a last element of a hash chain, i.e., a result of n consecutive hash calculations on a random number [8,9]. As the message traverses the network, intermediate nodes can validate cryptographically the signature and the hash value, generate a k th element of the hash chain, with k being the number of traversed hops, and add the hash chain to the message [10].

However, public-key cryptography imposes a high processing overhead on the nodes and may be unrealistic for practical low-cost, ad hoc networks of low-complexity devices, such as sensors. Hash chaining requires that the nodes have synchronized clocks [11]. However, that technique can only discover attacks long after they happened.

Hauser et al [12] avoid that defect by using hash chains to reveal the status of specific links in a link-state algorithm. Their method also requires synchronization of the nodes.

Hu [13] introduced another technique called SEAD that uses a node-unique hash chain that is divided into segments. The segments are used to authenticate hop counts. However, DSDV distributes routing information only periodically.

In many applications, reactive or on demand routing protocols are preferred. With on demand routing, source nodes request routes only as needed. On demand routing protocols performs better with significantly lower overhead than periodic routing protocols in many situations [13]. The authentication mechanism of Ariadne [13] is based on TESLA [15]. They use only efficient symmetric-key cryptographic primitives. The main drawback of that approach is the requirement of clock synchronization, which is very hard for wireless ad hoc networks.

Most secure routing protocols are based on authentication in the route discovery process. Some techniques detect faulty links based on observation of misbehavior during packet forwarding.

Marti et al [16] described a protocol for detecting and avoiding routers that drop or modify packets in ad hoc networks running DSR protocol. They have trusted nodes monitoring neighboring nodes. That technique does not work well in multi-rate wireless networks because nodes might be able to intercept packets forwarded with different modulations schemes. In addition, that method is vulnerable to collusion and misbehavior because there is no authentication.

Awerbuch et al [17] invention was based on adaptive probing techniques. However, malicious nodes can differentiate probing packets from normal data packets, and therefore, can selectively forward the probing packets to avoid detection.

Herzberg et al [18] described a combination of acknowledgements, timeouts and fault announcements, to detect packet forwarding faults. This proposal empirically described by Avramopoulos et al [19]. However, that protocol requires a separate authentication password for each of the intermediate router, thus adding more communication overhead when multi-hops are used.

A secure dynamic routing (SDR) [20] protocol is entirely on demand, and uses two primary mechanisms, route discovery and route maintenance. When a source node has a packet to send to a destination node but does not have a route to that destination node, the source node broadcasts a route request (RREQ) packet. The packet specifies the destination and a unique RREQ broadcast identifier. A receiving node attaches its own node address to a list in the RREQ and rebroadcast the RREQ. When the RREQ reaches the destination node, or any intermediate node that knows a route to the destination, that node sends a route reply (RREP) packet back to the source node, including an accumulated list of addresses from the source to the destination node. When the RREP reaches the source node, it stores the route in its route cache. Route maintenance is a mechanism for detecting changes in the topology of the network that can make a stored route invalid. This is done with a route error packet.

IV.


# SEAD-FHC

a) An algorithmic description of the SEAD-FHC 1. A method authenticates packets that are transmitted serially in a network. 2. A current password is selected for a current packet to be transmitted.


# 3.

Includes current data .


# 4.

A secure hash function is applied to the current password to form a current tag . 5. A password is selected for a packet that is in sequence and fallows , which includes data , and is applied to to form a tag .


# 6.

Is then applied to the , and to obtain a hashed value . 7.

Is then transmitted that includes the , , , password of packet that sent before in sequence to authenticate .

b) Algorithm to authenticate sequence transmission of the packets Countersign will be selected for that includes to be transmitted.


# =

Countersign will be selected for with data to be transmitted in sequence, = Apply to the , and that creates authentication tag for referred as Transmit from a source node to a destination node through hops in path selected through optimal route selection strategy. The currently transmitting packet contains and a countersign of packet that transmitted before to authenticate . In the interest of route maintenance, every hop in rout contains a cache that maintains hop list describing the route selected using an optimal route selection model. We apply on cache of each hop of the route to verify the integrity of the hop list cached.


# c) Architecture of the proposed protocol

Proposed model provides an authentication protocol for a wireless ad hoc network where packets are transmitted serially. By serially, we mean a current packet is immediately preceded by a previous packet , and followed immediately by a next packet .

More particularly, during a route discovery phase, we provide secure route selection, i.e., a shortest intact route, that is, a route without any faulty links. During route maintenance phase, while packets are forwarded, we also detect faulty links based on a time For packet authentication, we use described by Benjamin Arazi et al [21]. The hash function encodes a countersign to form a tag.

By we mean that the countersign cannot be decoded from the tag and the countersign is used only
( ) h f ( ) h f
once, because part of its value lies in its publication after its use. We have adapted that protocol for use in an ad hoc network where multiple packets need to be sent sequentially. Therefore, if a number of packets are sent sequentially, the countersign needs to be refreshed each time. Thus, a single authentication is associated with a stream of future packets that is significant difference between proposed and existing hash chain techniques. The existing models require stream of future events. In addition, the countersign is used to authenticate but not for future packets. c p be known ahead of time or distributed among the nodes after the system becomes operational. It should also be noted, that each countersign is used only one time, because the countersign is published to perform the authentication.

The as implemented by the proposal is ideal for serially communicating packets along a route in an ad hoc network, without requiring the nodes to establish shared secret countersigns beforehand. The protocol includes the following steps. Select a random countersign . Form a tag , = , Construct a message Form a hash value , and make it public.

Perform the act and reveal to authenticate the act.


# V. SIMULATION AND RESULTS DISCUSSION

The experiments were conducted using NS 2. We build a simulation network with hops under mobility and count of 100 to 1400. The simulation parameters described in table 1. We assume that each node has a memory buffer large enough to ensure that normal packets are never dropped because of congestion. Authentication ensures that the buffer is properly allocated to valid packets. Buffers also protect against traditional DoS, in which malicious nodes flood the network with unauthenticated packets. Malicious nodes that send packets frequently could otherwise quickly consume all allocated buffer space.

We authenticate route request (RREQ) by at source node and broadcast identifier in the route discovery phase, and data control packets in the packet forwarding phase. Thus, we prevent malicious requests and replay attacks. We also use a per-hop hashing to verify that no intermediate hop is omitted in a node list describing a route. A route reply (RREP) is authenticated by a destination node and therefore, attackers cannot cheat other nodes by fabricating routing information. Our authentication mechanism is different than existing secure routing protocols based on digital signature, because only efficient symmetric key cryptography is used. Our method is also better than existing hash chain based protocols, because a node stores only one countersign, while hash chain based protocols store multiple countersigns, which increases memory requirements.

To detect faulty links, we use acknowledgements, timeouts, and fault announcements; these can also be authenticated by our . Therefore, we need only a single authentication tag for each data and control packet; thereby bandwidth and memory usage is low.

With faulty link detection, all passive and active attackers that fail to forward data packets and that maliciously misdirect data packets are recognized and avoided in subsequent routings.


# a) Protocol Description i. Secure Route Discovery

In on demand routing protocols, e.g., DSR, a source node initiates route discovery to find a route when the source node has a packet to send to a destination node, and the source node does not store a   
( ) h f r cs r t r t ( ) ( ) h r f cs r mac ( ) ( , , ) r h r r r H f mac t cs = < > , ,r+ + + + + = < = > = = < = > = ( ) ds f id a id b ( ) ( ) ( ( ), ())ds s h r f n id f cs ( )( ( ), ( )s h r n id f cs ( ) ( , ,( ))id id h r a b f cs i RREQ s n id a s n id b ( ) ( ) r h r hcs f cs = ( ,( ), )e h s h r r h f n f cs cs + = , id id a b < > RREQ id b RREQ ( , ) s d n n k s n d n RREQ i RREQ m? m? s n 1 i RREQ + 2 r cs + 1 i RREQ + 1 1( )1 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 2( ) 2 2 1 1( ) ( ) 1 ( ) 2( ) ( ) 2 1 ( ) ( ), ( ) 2 ( ( ), ( )) ( ), ( ) 3 { , ( ), ), ( , ( ), ), ( ), ( , )+ + + + + = < = > = = < = > = ( ) h f r cs 1 i RREQ + r hcs i RREQ ( ) ( ) h r f cs r hcs h n ( ) h f 1( ), () 1 ( ( ),
) 
s id h r r n f cs cs + + 1 i RREQ + 2 e h 1 () 1 ( , ( ))s h r n f cs + + h n 1 i RREQ + id b h n id b 1 i RREQ + ( ) 1 ( ) r h r hcs f cs + = 2 2 ( )2 1 ( , ( ),

# iii. Data transmission and malicious hop detection

Here in this section we describe the procedure of authentication data packets forwarded from the source node to the destination node, along the selected route, while checking for faulty links. In DSR, the source route information is carried in each packet header.

To send a packet that is a part of data to be sent to destination node , the source node picks two counter signs and fixes the time limit to 
} i i h r d s i h r h i h r r msg m f cs f m f cs f m f cs cs + + =) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 { , ( ), ( , ( )), ( , ( ), )
to the along the route.

Here  
ds i h r f m f cs ( ) ( , ( ) i h r m f cs h n d n ( ) ( , ()) i h r m f cs s n ( ) ( ) h r f cs ( ) r s hcs n ( )1 ( ) 1 ( , ( ), )h i h r r f m f cs cs + + 2 ( ) e s h n 1 i msg + 1 i m + s n 2 r cs + 1 i msg + 1 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 2 1 { , ( ), ,( , ( ), )n h n 1 h n ? ( )1 ( ) 1 ( , ( ), )h i h r r f m f cs cs + + i msg 1 h n ? ( )1 ( ) 1 ( , ( ), )h i h r r f m f cs cs + + 1 i msg + h n 1 h n ? ack 1 ( , ) h h n n ? 2 h n ? 2 1 ( , ) h h n n ? ? s n 1 h n ?
In our proposed model the authentication tag of each packet limited to two hashes and one countersign; while in the existing models required N authentication tags for a route with N hops. Therefore, our method has a lower communication and storage overhead. message with the format updates its routing entry by recording and , and forwards the data packet to the node along the route as specified in the header of the packet header. this proposed model, the packets are always received as in the order they sent. This is because all packets are forwarded along the same route in DSR. In the case of congestion and buffering, the messages are stored in a first-in-first-out buffer according to the order that they are received.

When the source node wants to use another path to the destination node, the source node selects a new countersign and authenticates the countersign with every node along the new route, and reinitiates the entire process, as described above.


# b) Results Discussion

Here we describe the scalability of SEAD-FHC over SEAD in terms of control packet that costs resource utilization. We can observe that SEAD-FHC is almost similar to SEAD when node count is fewer. But we can observe that SEAD-FHC improving the minimization of the control packets when node count increased. It is obvious since the SEAD-FHC stabilizing the delay time even at maximum node count, which helps in minimizing packet drops due to delay and improves throughput. This results as fewer control packet utilization.

Here we describe the scalability of SEAD-FHC over SEAD in terms of packet delivery ratio. Since Hash chain computation cost is drastically minimized in SEAD-FHC, the delay time minimized and throughput increased.

Here we describe the performance of SEAD-FHC over SEAD in terms of Hash chain evaluation cost. Let be the cost threshold to evaluate each hash in hash chain. We measure the Hash chain evaluation cost as ? , here z is number of nodes and n is number of hashes, as of the chaining concept of SEAD z=n but in SEAD-FHC n always 2 
![Receiving an acknowledgement control packet signals successful delivery of a packet.](image-2.png "")
![](image-3.png "Table1")
![receive either one of packet delivery acknowledgement or a control packet that acknowledges about malicious link in the route path. The source node sends](image-4.png "")
![Journals Inc. (US)](image-5.png "")
s id ns n a n b id s idsigs nfdss n id f cs h rs id ns n a n b id s idi RREQs id nh f cs sig rs nh f n s idh f csrr cs n a d idh f n n s d
s n+idn a n b + +csfdss n id f cs h +r+s n+ids n a n b id s id + +i RREQ+s nidh f csrsigs n+h f n sidh f csrcsrd n a idh f n n s d
SEAD-FHC: Secure Efficient Distance Vector Routing with Fixed Hash Chain lengthintermediate hops, where 'z' is count of the intermediatehops.2011Where freshness of the reply. .As the is for the sourceto verify the packet passesDecemberthrough intermediate nodes back to the source node,each node checks the corresponding authentication tag, and stores the route information in its route cache. The47source node then selects a shortest route to thedestination node without previously detected faulty links.rkthk RREQm?after sending the previous request1 RREQ ? k. Then, thesource node selects a new random countersign1 cs + k,and broadcastsk RREQ:As a part of process at , appends its own h naddress to the intermediate node list in theRREQ,performs the per-hop hashing, which is achieved bycalculating a new hash tag by hashing its own addressconcatenated with the old hash tag, and replacing theold hash tag, then rebroadcasts the RREQ. If any checkfails, the RREQ is dropped.Thus, with per-hop hashing, an attacker cannotdelete an intermediate node from the node list, becausee hs n RREQ + f cs h + = 2 ir+csr+the attacker does not have the secret countersign between the intermediate node and the destination node.© 2011 Global Journals Inc. (US)
During the packet sending process describedearlier, if any of the checks fails, then the packet isdropped. If both checks succeed, then the nodeupdates its routing entry associated with . If the checkat , then eitherorinhas been modified, or nodemodifiedin. In either case, thecurrent hop nodedrops the packet. Consequently,hop nodedoes not receive a validafter timeout, and the node can report a malicious activity atmsgi+=i m f cs h r ++r cs f m h i+h f csr+csr+connection, or the hop nodereportsabout malicious activity betweento . InEach node on the route calculates( ) ( ) h r f cseither case, the fault link includes the malicious nodeand compares with( ) s hcs n rthat available in routing.table, if results equal thenr cswill be authenticated asvalid. The then calculates h n( ) h f m ( i1 +,( ) h f cs (r1 +), ) r cs,and compares with2 ( ) n h s eresult is equivalent thenclaims the validity of(, m f cs ( i h r ++)). The node thens
			© 2011 Global Journals Inc. (US)
			© 2011 Global Journals Inc. (US) Global Journal of Computer Science and Technology Volume XI Issue XX Version I 45 2011 December SEAD-FHC: Secure Efficient Distance Vector Routing with Fixed Hash Chain length
			DecemberSEAD-FHC: Secure Efficient Distance Vector Routing with Fixed Hash Chain length
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			© 2011 Global Journals Inc. (US) Global Journal of Computer Science and Technology Volume XI Issue XX Version I 48 2011 December SEAD-FHC: Secure Efficient Distance Vector Routing with Fixed Hash Chain length
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			December SEAD-FHC: Secure Efficient Distance Vector Routing with Fixed Hash Chain length VI.
			© 2011 Global Journals Inc. (US) Global Journal of Computer Science and Technology Volume XI Issue XX Version I
			DecemberSEAD-FHC: Secure Efficient Distance Vector Routing with Fixed Hash Chain length
		
		
			

When the reaches the' ', then verifies it by checking if If the check succeeds, then the integrity of this is verified, along with the authenticity of its origin and every intermediate node along the path from node to node .Then sends a back to the source node, including an authenticated copy of the accumulated list of addresses from the i.e., the packet data for the control packet. 

The packet authentication process at is identical to the authentication process at any intermediate hop . If any of the checks fails, then the packet is dropped. If both checks succeed, the packet is delivered successfully, and schedules the ' ' for transmission along the reverse of path of the route. The reflects the packet identification number . The destination node also appends an authentication tag to the message for the nodes on the reverse path. The authentication tag bears the same structure as the one generated by the source node. Specifically, when sending , for the packet ' ', the destination node randomly selects two countersigns and , and sends the following information:

.  When a node receives the , the node verifies its authenticity and that a timeout is pending for the corresponding data packet. If the ' ' is not authentic or a timeout is not pending, the node discards the . Otherwise; the node cancels the timeout and forwards the ' to the next node. When a node receives , it verifies its authenticity, and that a timeout is pending for the corresponding data packet, and that the link reported in the is the first downstream to the node that generated . If the is not authentic, or a timeout is not pending, or the link is not the downstream to the node reporting ' ', then the node drops . Otherwise, the node cancels the timeout and further forwards the control packet. Upon receiving ' ', the source node deletes the link that connecting referred in and finds a new route. In


## CONCLUSION

Here in this paper we proposed a secure efficient distance vector routing with fixed hash chain length in short we referred as SEAD-FHC. We argued that fixed hash chain limits the computation cost and resource utilization. We empirically demonstrated that SEAD-FHC is scalable and performs well over SEAD. In future experiments can target to extend this protocol to support path restoration mechanism. Here SEAD-FHC relies on new route detection upon link failure.
			
			

				


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		ACM International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing
				Long Beach, CA
		
			MobiHoc 2001. October 2001
			
		
	




* 
	
		A performance comparison of multi-hop wireless ad hoc network routing protocols
		
			JBroch
		
		
			DAMaltz
		
		
			DBJohnson
		
		
			Y.-CHu
		
		
			JGJetcheva
		
	
	
		Proceedings of the Fourth Annual ACM/IEEE International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking (MobiCom98)
				the Fourth Annual ACM/IEEE International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking (MobiCom98)
		
			October 1998